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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Search and Seizure of Person
and Property: State v. Lovato
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Lovato,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals dealt with the
controversial issue of how far an investigative stop may go before it
constitutes an arrest. The court held that, as a matter of law, actions
by police officers which included handcuffing suspects at gunpoint did
not constitute an unlawful arrest within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2 This casenote examines
the historical background of the investigatory detention versus unlawful
arrest as defined by both the United States Supreme Court and the New
Mexico courts. Next, this casenote describes and analyzes the New Mexico
Court of Appeals' decision in Lovato. Finally, the policy utilized by the
court of appeals is examined.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures by the United States
government. 3 In Mapp v. Ohio,4 the United States Supreme Court extended
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures to the state level through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, which protects state citizens from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.' The New Mexico Constitution contains a provision protecting against unreasonable searches
and seizures almost identical to the United States Constitution's Fourth
Amendment.
In the leading United States Supreme Court case distinguishing between
an investigatory stop and an arrest, Terry v. Ohio,7 the Court held that

1. 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 388 (1991).
2. Id.
3. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CO ST. amend. IV.
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Id.
6. This provision states that:
[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
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when an officer grabbed the defendant, spun him around, conducted a
frisk of his outer clothing, ordered him into a store upon feeling a gun
in his jacket, removed the gun along with his jacket, and, finally, ordered
him to face the wall with his hands raised, the defendant had not been
"arrested" so as to require a finding of probable cause for the search
and seizure. Instead, the Court found that it is not always necessary for
a policeman to have probable cause for an arrest to detain a person
properly and to conduct a limited search for weapons upon that person. 8
The Terry Court held that where a police officer has a reasonable suspicion
"that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous ... he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others ... to conduct a carefully limited
9
search" without this suspicion rising to the level of probable cause. In
Terry, therefore, the Court took a restricted view of Fourth Amendment
protections by allowing officers great leeway in detaining suspects and
by allowing them to take measures that are reasonably necessary to
provide for their safety under the circumstances without this action
constituting an actual arrest.' 0
New Mexico courts adopted the Terry Court's definitions of an arrest;"
however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals further restricted Fourth
Amendment rights with its decision in Lovato. In Boone v. State,'2 the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that a person has been seized when
his freedom is restricted by a police officer and he is under the control
of that officer.' 3 In Boone, the court found that the defendant was
arrested when he was ordered to take a field sobriety test, even though
the arrest was not formal.' 4 The Boone court cited State v. Frazier'5 as
precedent for the proposition that an arrest has occurred when a person's
freedom of action is restricted by a police officer and he is subject to
the constraint of that officer.' 6 In Frazier, the court of appeals held that
the defendant was arrested when police seized her as she ran out of her
motel room after the police attempted to help the motel owner evict her.
The court determined that the defendant's actions in that case did not
warrant the actions taken by the police officer; thus, it was an illegal
arrest.' 7 This holding overturned the lower court's refusal to suppress
because it was obtained as a result of an illegal
incriminating evidence
8
seizure.'
and
search

8. Id. at 1-3.
9. Id. at 30.
10. Id.; see also United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1989) ("An arrest or
seizure occurs 'when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
'); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.
way restrained the liberty of a citizen ....
1986); United States v. McDevitt, 508 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974).
11. See State v. Frazier, 88 N.M. 103, 105, 537 P.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 1975).
12. 105 N.M. 223, 731 P.2d 366 (1986).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 227, 731 P.2d at 370.
15. 88 N.M. 103, 537 P.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1975).
16. Boone, 105 N.M at 227, 731 P.2d at 370.
17. Frazier, 88 N.M. at 105, 537 P.2d at 713.
18. Id. at 104, 537 P.2d at 712.
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The court of appeals in Lovato, however, departed from the less
restrictive view of Fourth Amendment rights found in Boone and Frazier.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 31, 1989, Albuquerque city police officers received a report
of a drive-by shooting in an area known as "Martineztown." A radio
dispatch to police officers in the vicinity described a car seen leaving the
area as a white Chevrolet Impala.' 9
Officer Lucero testified that he was in a patrol car driven by another
officer when he received the dispatch. As the officers were driving north
toward Martineztown, they observed a 1976 white Impala pulling out of
a side street in the Martineztown area and heading south. No other
vehicles were in the area. The police car turned around and followed
the Impala for less than a minute before stopping20 it. There were five
males in the car; three in front and two in back.
Lucero further testified that after stopping the car, the officers commenced "felony stop" procedures. He called for back-up and then requested that the five men in the car lace their fingers behind their necks.
When back-up units arrived, he directed the men to get out of the car
one at a time from the driver's door and walk backwards toward the
back of the car. He then handcuffed all five2 of the men. The officers
had their guns drawn during this procedure. '
After the five men got out of the car, Lucero testified that he suspected
that one more person might still be in the car hiding or lying on the
floor. Two officers moved toward the car on either side with their guns
drawn. As Lucero opened the door on the right side of the car, a shotgun
The shotgun was seized as evidence and the
fell out onto the ground.
22
men were arrested.

The defendants moved to suppress the shotgun evidence at a pre-trial
hearing. At that hearing, Officer Lucero stated that the radio dispatch
described the suspect vehicle as an "older model" Impala. A tape recording was then played of testimony given by Lucero at an earlier
hearing where he stated that the dispatch described the car seen leaving
the area of the shooting as a "late" or "later model" car. Officer Lucero
testified further 23 that he thought "late" model was synonymous with
"older"

model.

The police broadcast failed to indicate how many occupants were in
the car, the number of people involved in the shooting, the car's license
plate number, or the direction in which the car was believed to be
traveling. Following the hearing, the court ordered that the evidence be
suppressed. In so doing, the trial court determined that the facts available

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Lovato, 112 N.M. at 518, 817 P.2d at 252.
Id.at 518-19, 817 P.2d at 252-53.
Id. at 518, 817 P.2d at 252.
Id. at 518-19, 817 P.2d at 252-53.
Id. at 519, 817 P.2d at 253.
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to the officer making the stop were insufficient to infer that the vehicle
was connected with any illegal activity.24 The State appealed.
DISCUSSION OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court of appeals addressed four issues in its review of the trial
court's decision. One of these issues was whether the trial court should
be affirmed on alternative grounds because, as a matter of law, the stop
constituted an arrest requiring a showing of probable cause. 25 Because
this issue was not raised in the trial court, the court of appeals did not
have the benefit of the trial court's findings of fact, which would have
been pertinent to determining whether or not the stop constituted an
arrest. The court indicated that prior case law held that a determination
regarding whether or not an arrest 26has occurred during a stop depends
on the particular facts of the case.
The defendants argued that the stop constituted an arrest because they
were forced at gunpoint to remain in the car with their hands laced
behind their heads, were then forced to get out of the car and walk
backwards toward the officers, and27 finally were handcuffed without any
prior questioning or investigation.
The court of appeals disagreed. The court first stated that the level
of intrusiveness accompanying a stop may vary depending on the facts
justifying the stop. 28 The ultimate question determining whether or not
a stop constitutes an arrest is whether the actions of the officers during
the stop were reasonable under the circumstances. 29 The court held that
"the level of force used by the officers in effecting the investigative
detention in this case did not, as a matter of law, convert the initial
stop into an arrest." 30 In so doing, the court quoted with approval the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Merritt:3 'Whenever
the police confront an individual reasonably believed to present a serious
and imminent danger to the safety of the police and public, they are
justified in taking reasonable steps to reduce the risk [of injury]." ''3 2 The
an investigative stop does not necessarily turn
use of force in conducting
33
arrest.
an
into
stop
that
The court's decision in Lovato extended the point at which an investigative stop, which requires reasonable suspicion, turns into an arrest,
IV.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 521, 817 P.2d at 255. The other issues the court addressed, which will not be the
focus of this casenote, were: 1) whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop; 2) whether
the trial court's order suppressing evidence was supported by substantial evidence; and 3) whether
opening the door of the car by police amounted to an illegal search and seizure. Id. at 519-24,
817 P.2d at 253-59.
26. See State v. Cobbs, 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1985).
27. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 522, 817 P.2d at 256.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 523, 817 P.2d at 257.
31. 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983).
32. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 523, 817 P.2d at 257 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263,
1274 (10th Cir. 1982)).
33. Id.
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which requires probable cause. In laying out the historical legal background of arrest versus investigative stop, the court of appeals relied on
State v. Cobbs34 to support the principle that "whether an arrest has
occurred depends on the facts of each particular case." ' 3 In Cobbs,
however, it was not the arrest that was in dispute; rather the issue was
whether the Fourth Amendment required an officer to conduct preliminary
questioning before he took measures pursuant to an investigatory stop
in light of the surrounding circumstances.1 6 The Cobbs court held that
a determination of reasonableness under the circumstances should weigh
the state's interest against the defendant's right to be free of arbitrary
interference by police officers.3 7 The outcome of this balancing test will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.3" The
Lovato court applied the Cobbs premise-whether prior questioning is
required before a patdown depends on the facts and circumstances of
each particular case-to the detention measures used in this case to decide
whether or not an arrest had occurred.
The issue of whether the stop constituted an arrest was not raised in
the trial court; thus, the court of appeals did not have the benefit of
the trial court's findings of fact pertaining to that issue. 3 9 The trial court
made no findings of fact on the issue as to whether the stop constituted
an arrest. The court of appeals, therefore, was faced with a determination
of "whether, as a matter of law, the intrusive nature of the stop renders
the encounter an arrest rather than a stop." 4 The court's holding that
the stop did not constitute an arrest as a matter of law hinged on the
question of whether the officers' actions in stopping the car and ordering
its occupants out of the car were reasonable under the circumstances. 41
The court relied on a United States Supreme Court detention case,
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 42 in which the Court stated that, even in routine
traffic stops, police are allowed to take measures to protect themselves
as long as these measures are addressed to reasonable fears. 43 In Mimms,
the defendant's vehicle was stopped because its license plates were expired.
When the defendant stepped out of the car at the officers' request, the
officers noticed a bulge in his jacket, frisked him, and discovered a
loaded gun." The Court reasoned that the frisk was addressed to the
officers' reasonable fear that they could be in danger and, thus, it was
not an unlawful search and seizure. 45 The court in Lovato used the

34. 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1985).
35. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 521, 817 P.2d at 255 (citing State v. Cobbs, 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d
900 (Ct. App. 1985)).
36. Cobbs, 103 N.M. at 627, 711 P.2d at 904.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 521, 817 P.2d at 255.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 522, 817 P.2d at 256.

42. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Mimms decision to support the notion that the facts in the instant case
were even more supportive of a reasonable fear of imminent danger
because of the nature of the stop in response to a dispatch describing
a drive-by shooting. If precautionary measures can be taken even in
routine traffic stops, a situation such as the one in Lovato definitely
warranted the precautionary measures taken by the officers. The occupants
of the car were believed to be armed; thus, the actions of the officers
in calling for backup and taking such steps to determine whether the
occupants were armed did not constitute a level of intrusion that was
inappropriate given the danger the officers could reasonably have believed
existed. 4"
47
The court rejected the defendants' reliance on United States v. Strickler
to argue the stop constituted an arrest without probable cause.4 In
Strickler, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an officer's
actions in stopping a car and requiring its occupants to get out of the
car at gunpoint constituted an arrest. 49 The Lovato court concluded that
the reliance on Strickler was misplaced because that decision had been
eroded by subsequent decisions of the same court which explained the
case as based on the use of excessive force under circumstances in which
the court determined that no threat to the safety of the officers existed.50
Finally, the court compared the facts in Lovato to the facts in a Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals case, United States v. Merritt.5 In Merritt,
police officers, who had a reasonable suspicion based on specific facts
that the suspect-defendant was one of three men in a pick-up truck,
surrounded the truck with their guns drawn and demanded the occupants
get out of the truck.5 2 Ultimately, twelve to fifteen officers were at the
scene, with two or three of them carrying shotguns, and at least one
pointing his gun." The Merritt court held that the manner of this stop
did not transform it into an arrest.14 In holding this, the court reasoned
that the officers' need for safety was such that the amount of force used
was reasonable under the circumstances.55 The Lovato court applied the

46. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 522, 817 P.2d at 256.
47. 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974).
48. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 522, 817 P.2d at 256.
49. Strickler, 490 F.2d at 379-80.
50. Lovato, 112 N.M. at 522, 817 P.2d at 256. The court referred to United States v. Patterson,
648 F.2d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 1981), stating,"[t]he Ninth Circuit noted that Strickler should not be
read as indicating that every forceful detention turns a stop into an arrest." Lovato, 112 N.M. at
522, 817 P.2d at 256. The court also referred to United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1983), stating,"the [Taylor] court explained that the use of drawn guns does not automatically turn
a vehicle stop into an arrest." Lovato, 112 N.M. at 522, 817 P.2d at 256; see also United States
v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983) (policemen making investigatory stops should be able to
protect themselves from attack by hostile suspects and, depending on the circumstances, the intrusiveness of an investigatory stop does not transform it into an arrest requiring probable cause).
51. 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983).
52. Id. at 1265-67.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 523, 817 P.2d at 257.
55. Id.
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principle used in the Merritt decision to determine that the investigatory
56
stop did not go far enough to convert it into an unlawful arrest.
Specifically, the court determined that the facts in Lovato were so
similar to the situation present in Merritt that the amount of force used
by Officer Lucero in effecting the investigatory stop was reasonable and,
as a matter of law, did not constitute an arrest. The Merritt court did
not, however, have to deal with the fact that the defendants were handcuffed. In Lovato, the defendants were handcuffed before they were
formally arrested and the court held that this action still did not constitute
an arrest.5 7 No other New Mexico case, holding that no arrest occurred,
exists in which similar actions were taken by police officers during an
investigatory detention and the suspects were handcuffed prior to formal
arrest. In this respect, Merritt is not factually similar to Lovato. In
Lovato, police officers took the investigatory stop one step further than
did the officers in Merritt by handcuffing the suspects. Thus, the court
of appeals, by using Merritt as precedent, allowed even more intrusive
actions by police officers against suspects without these actions constituting
an arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This expansion of the
holding in Merritt could greatly facilitate New Mexico police action during
investigatory detentions in the future by indicating that police can, under
certain circumstances, lawfully handcuff suspects prior to formal arrest
without intruding on a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals did not announce any policy for their holding
in Lovato. One possible reason for this, however, may be that it is
responding to a national trend of courts being "tough on crime," especially in the Fourth Amendment context. The most important proponent
of this trend is the United States Supreme Court, which has "generally
continued to be unreceptive to Fourth Amendment claims." ' 58
Another reason for the Lovato decision might rest in the judges' desire
to avoid the public uproar that is always likely to occur when blatantly
guilty defendants are let off on perceived legal "technicalities." Judges
at the state level would have an interest in avoiding such public disapproval
because of the election and retention system that exists for the New
Mexico judiciary. 9
These policy theories, however, must also take into consideration the
disparity of the holdings in recent New Mexico cases which have dealt
with search and seizure issues. On one hand, New Mexico courts have
recently narrowed citizens' rights in the context of seizures of their person

56. Id.
57. Id. at 518-19, 817 P.2d at 252-53.
58. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a GeneralReasonableness Interpretation of

the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. Cium. L. Rav. 119, 123 (1989).
59. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33 (providing for retention and rejection elections in New
Mexico).
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and property. 60 By comparison, however, New Mexico courts have afforded greater protection in the area of searches of private residences. 6'
Therefore, Lovato, by holding that the actions taken by the officers in
that case did not as a matter of law constitute an unlawful arrest, is
consistent with recent law in narrowing the protection of Fourth Amendment rights in the area of seizure of persons and their property. 62 In the
analysis of applicable case law dealing with the same and similar issues,
the Lovato court stretched this precedent to a fact pattern that was the
most intrusive of a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure that has come before the New Mexico courts to date.
JULIE M. BARDACKE

60. See, e.g., State v. Boswell, 111 N.M. 240, 804 P.2d 1059 (1991) (seizure and search of
wallet valid under inventory search theory, even though wallet was at location separate from arrested
defendant, because the governmental interests involved in inventory searches justified the officer's
unauthorized seizure and search of the wallet). For a more detailed discussion of Boswell, see
Stanley N. Harris et al., Survey, Criminal Procedure, 22 N.M. L. Rav. 713 (1992).
61. See State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989) (court adopted, under New Mexico
Constitution, more stringent search warrant test than that adopted by United States Supreme Court
under federal Constitution). For a more detailed discussion of Cordova, see Michael J. Dekleva et
al., Survey, Criminal Procedure, 21 N.M. L. REv. 623, 625-27 (1991).
62. See, e.g., State v. Boswell, IIl N.M. 240, 804 P.2d 1059 (1991).

